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IN THE COURT OF CO:M:MON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY

ALAN DAVIS, Special Administrator
of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard,

CASE NO. 312322
JUDGE SUSTER

Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF OHIO,
Defendant.

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
REGARDING ADMISSABILITY
OF STATEMENTS OF SAMUEL H.
AND MEMORANDUM REGARDING
ADMISSABILITY OF CHARCTER
EVIDENCE OF SAMUEL H.
SHEPPARD

INTRODUCTION

On February 17, 2000, the State of Ohio filed a memorandum to advise the Court of
its intention to offer the Coroner Inquest testimony of Samuel H. Sheppard and other statements of
Samuel H. Sheppard including those made to police investigators and Coroner Sam Gerber. The
thrust of that memorandum was to set forth that the admission of these statements is not barred by the
Evid.R. 802, prohibiting the introduction of certain hearsay, because the Sheppard statements do not
constitute hearsay. The State of Ohio does not offer these statements for the truth of the matters
asserted. Indeed, the State's position is that the content of the statements were fabricated and that
the fabrications evolved in the various statements to match the physical evidence and facts as they
were being uncovered.
Additionally, the State urged that the very fact that Samuel H. Sheppard told
inconsistent and evolving lies accounts relevant since such behavior is inconsistent with innocence.
Regardless of the truth of any aspect of any of the statements, the very fact that the accounts given

-

by Samuel H. Sheppard regularly changed is relevant in and of itself.
This memorandum will further explain the reasons why the statements of Samuel H.
Sheppard are admissible, particularly in light of the fact that plaintiff has made Samuel H. Sheppard a
"declarant" in this case by submitting as substantive evidence the hearsay testimony of Samuel H.
Sheppard. See Evid. R. 806.

In summary, the statements of Samuel H. Sheppard are admissible because:
1. They are not being offered by defendant to prove the truth of the
matters asserted.
2. The statements are relevant because the question of Samuel H.
Sheppard's innocence is less likely to be true by the very fact that his
accounts altered over time.

·-

3. Hearsay statements of Samuel H. Sheppard have already been
admitted into evidence. Pursuant to Evid. R. 806, Sheppard's
credibility as a declarant can now be attacked through his inconsistent
statements and otherwise.
4. Inconsistency in statements is established when material fact is
omitted in some versions when several accounts are given by a
declarant.
5. Alternatively, the statements of Samuel H. Sheppard are party
admissions pursuant to Evid. R. 80l(D)(2)(b). By maintaining this
action as a survivorship action pursuant to R.C. 2305 .21, the Estate of
Samuel H. Sheppard has manifested its adoption/belief in the truth of
the statements of Samuel H. Sheppard regarding the death of Marilyn
Sheppard. Also, Samuel Reese Sheppard, as trial representative of the
Estate, has manifested his adoption and belief in the truth of his
father's statements in a variety of ways, including co-authorship of the
book "Mockery of Justice."

Additionally, a question has now arisen as to whether the State of Ohio will be
permitted to elicit testimony regarding marital discord between Samuel and Marilyn Sheppard and to

-

2

rebut the character evidence already put into evidence by plaintiff
As explained below, plaintiff has "opened the door" to the character of Samuel H.
Sheppard. Moreover, evidence of "other acts" related to Samuel H. Sheppard's marriage are
admissible to establish the purpose and motive of his conduct which resulted in the death of Marilyn
Sheppard.

THE
STATEMENTS OF SAMUEL H.
SHEPPARD ARE NOT OFFERED FOR THEIR
TRUTH

The State of Ohio does not contend that the contents of the various statements of
Samuel H. Sheppard are true. "A statement is not hearsay ifit is admitted to prove that the declarant

v

made it, rather than to prove the truth of its contents." State v. Williams (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 346,

-

348. Irrespective of "the truth" of the contents of the statements, their relevance flows from their
internal inconsistency, their alteration in account during which material details were added to match
the discovery by officials of physical or other important facts.
"It is axiomatic that a statement is not hearsay if it is only offered for the fact that it

was made, not for the truth of the matter asserted." State v. Workman (8th Dist. 1984), 14 Ohio App.
3d 385, 392. Plaintiff argues that the statements are hearsay because the State of Ohio advances that
they were "truly" stated. Plaintiff misses the point. The fact that the statements were "truly" made
does not qualify the statements as hearsay. They are only hearsay if, after establishing proof that they
were "truly" stated, the State were to also advocate the truth of the contents of the statement.
Plaintiff's confused interpretation of the definition of hearsay must be rejected by this Court.

-
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PLAINTIFF HAS MADE SAMUEL H.
SHEPPARD A HEARSAY DECLARANT
WHOSE CREDIBILITY MAY NO\V BE
ATTACKED PURSUANT TO EVID. R. 806

Through various witnesses, including the examination of Fred Drenkhan and the
testimony off. Lee Bailey, the hearsay testimony of Samuel H. Sheppard has already been admitted
into evidence. As such, the State of Ohio is now permitted to attack the credibility of Samuel H.
Sheppard the same as if he had been a testifying witness. Evid. R. 806 provides. in pertinent part:

(A) When a hearsay statement ... has been admitted in evidence, the
creditability of the declarant may be attacked ... by any evidence that
would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a
witness.

-

The credibility of Samuel H. Sheppard is now subject to attack by the State of Ohio by
all permissible means, including the presentation of inconsistent statements, bias, interest, etc.
When hearsay testimony is admitted in a trial, particularly, when the declarant of
hearsay is not presented at trial, Evid.R. 806 operates to alleviate in some degree the disadvantage to
the adverse party since the jury is not given an opportunity to view the declarant's demeanor or "to

""""

see his credibility and veracity tested under cross-examination." State v. Klein (1983), 11 Ohio App.
3d 208, 212. Indeed, the refusal to permit an attack on the credibility of a hearsay declarant is highly

--

prejudicial and has resulted in the reversal of criminal convictions. State v. Klein, supra, at 212.
(Inasmuch as the trial court received in evidence [ declarant] Emmons' hearsay statement through
[witness] Taylor's testimony, it committed error prejudicial to [criminal defendant] appellant by
excluding Emmons' inconsistent written statements offered to impeach him.
v'

-

Reversal [of the

conviction] is therefore required.") (State v. Crossen October 18, 1988), 4th Dist. Case No. 902,
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unreported, (attached) (reversing a conviction and holding that non-testifying "declarant's
inconsistent prior or subsequent statements, whether oral or written, may be admitted for the
purposes of impeaching him.")
The right to impeach a non-testifying declarant pursuant to Evid.R. 806 exists
irrespective of whether the party against whom the hearsay was admitted objected and even if the
proponent of the hearsay later argues that the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the

v

matter asserted. State v. Watson ( 1991 ), 61 Ohio St. 3d 1, 6-7. In the instant case, the statements of
Samuel H. Sheppard already admitted into evidence were plainly offered for the truth of their content.
Additionally, the State of Ohio is entitled to demonstrate to the jury that Samuel H.
Sheppard told inconsistent versions, including the omission of materials details in his numerous

.,.,.

accounts. As stated in State v. Klein, supra, at 212:

As a prerequisite for admitting prior or subsequent statements for
impeachment purposes, the proponent must satisfy a threshold
inconsistency requirement. In Ohio, the rule is a liberal one with
respect to establishing inconsistency. The threshold inconsistency
requirement is met if a statement offered for impeachment can be
interpreted in either of two ways, though only one interpretation is
actually inconsistent with the testimony of the witness sought to be
impeached .... Ql1io law recognjw_ contradiction by reference to a
material fact omitted in a witness' prior or subsequent statement.

Demonstrating that a declarant has altered versions of their statements is a cornerstone to attacking

...,,,

credibility and does not constitute inadmissible hearsay. U.S. v. King (C.A. 6 1993), Case No. 922279, unreported (attached). There, an F.B.I. agent originally testified that he told another agent that
he had reservations about his identification of the defendant. The agent later testified that he told the

-

other agent that he was certain about his identification stated the court:
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-

Defense counsel was entitled to explore this discrepancy, not for the
truth of the matter asserted, which would be hearsay, but to impeach
Agent Statlla's credibility by demonstrating to the jury that Agent
Statlla had altered his testimony.
Even prior to plaintiff presenting Samuel H. Sheppard as a hearsay declarant, the
statements of Samuel H. Sheppard would have been admissible because they were relevant (an
innocent man need not change or alter his story) and not hearsay because they were not offered for
the truth of their content. Now that Samuel H. Sheppard has become a hearsay declarant, the State
of Ohio is fully entitled to attack his credibility through use ofinconsistent statements and otherwise.

MOREOVER,
THE
STATEMENTS
OF
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD ARE ADMISSIBLE AS
"ADOPTIVE" PARTY ADMISSIONS

-

Evid.R. 801 (D)(2)(b) provides in pertinent part:
(D) Statements which are not hearsay
A statement is not hearsay if:

***
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a
party and is ... (b )a statement of which he has manifested his adoption
or belief in its truth ....
All that is required for the finding of an adoptive admission is that there be a
manifestation of the party's intent to adopt another's statement or evidence of the party's beliefin the
./

truth of this statement. U.S. v. Rollins (1988), 862 F.2d 1182, 1296. A manifestation can be by
words, conduct, or, under certain circumstances, by silence.
Jn the instant case, plaintiff has been permitted to maintain this action pursuant to R.C.

6

2305.21. That section provides for the survival of certain causes of action despite the death of the
person entitled to the cause of action. In other words, the Estate "stands in the shoes" of the person
entitled to the cause of action. By the conduct of initiating a survivorship action, the Estate of
Samuel H. Sheppard has certainly manifested its adoption and/or belief of the truth of Samuel H.
Sheppard's statements relative to his claim of innocence and wrongful imprisonment.
Additionally, while the Adminstrator of the Estate is the nominal party, the real party
in interest is Samuel Reese Sheppard, a beneficiary of the Estate and the Estate's trial represenative.
Samuel Reese Sheppard has manifested his belief in his father's innocence and his father's version of
events in numerable ways, including his co-authoriship of"Mockery ofJustice." An entire thesis of
that book is the adoption of the statements of Samuel H. Sheppard regarding the circumstances

-

surrounding the death of Marilyn Sheppard as true statements establishing the purported innocence of
Samuel H. Sheppard.
Evid.R. 801 (D)(2)(b) has operated in a fashion which has contributed to the
conviction of defendants based upon their "adoption" of statements of others. Certainly, it is no huge
leap to hold that the rule was also intended to place an estate in a survivorship action squarely in the
shoes of the decedent by holding the estate to the statements of its decedent.

-
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THE PLAINTIFF HAS OPENED THE DOOR TO
CHARACTER
EVIDENCE
REGARDING
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD AND "OTHER ACTS"
REGARDING THE SHEPPARD MARRIAGE IS
ADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO EVID.R. 404(B)

Plaintiff has presented through the testimony of numerous witnesses evidence that
Samuel H. Sheppard was supposedly a good, even tempered man with a happy and satisfying
marriage. Plainly, plaintiff has put Samuel H. Sheppard's character in issue. As such, the State of
Ohio is permitted to rebut the testimony .
./
In State v. Schmidt (1979), 65 Ohio App. 2d 239, the State introduced testimony in a
murder case

evid~ncit'fgth~~h~ra~ter and re~~ta~e deceased victim as a quiet and peaceable
"-------

--

person. By doing so, the State had placed the victim's character in issue. The defense counsel, "for

-

tactical reasons or otherwise ... did not object to this incompetent evidence introduced by the state. It
was, therefore, properly admitted in evidence."
permitted to offi r

_________

ML at 242-43. As a consequence, the defendant was

count;~ailing evidence~hat the decedent was neither a good family man
,

nor a quiet and peaceable person. The concept of 'opening the door' is based upon a theory that it is
unjust to prevent a party from introducing irrelevant evidence to rebut irrelevant evidence that was
...,,/

submitted by the opposing party." State v. Croom (8th App. Dist. 1996), Case No. 67135, unreported
(attached). Plaintiff has placed Samuel H. Sheppard's character in issue and the State of Ohio is
entitled to rebut that evidence. This case is approaching day six of the trial. No instruction by the
Court can undue the harm of the admission of character evidence that had already occurred.
Moreover, "other acts" testimony regarding the Sheppard marriage are independently
admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) for the purpose of establishing the reasons and motives

-
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actuating Samuel H. Sheppard's conduct which resulted in the killing of his wife Marilyn. The State's
theory is premised upon one of the most fundamental realities of human relationships and the human
condition.

That is, that long seated infidelities, resentments, disappointments, and feelings of

entrapment, jealousy, etc. in a marital relationship can lead to bitter anger and violent behavior on the
part of both partners and can erupt into uncontrolled violence and death. The admission of such
evidence is relevant and admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) and particularly warranted since

\/"
plaintiff has "opened the door". Evid.R. 404(B) fully applies to civil actions. Tschantz v. Ferguson
(8th District 1994), 97 Ohio App. 3d 693.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State of Ohio should be permitted to introduce any and
all statements of Samuel H. Sheppard and any and all evidence regarding his character and the
conditions of his marriage.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

1

KATHLEEN A. MARTIN (0040017)
Litigation Manager, Civil Division
The Justice Center, Courts Tower
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Admissability of
Statements of Samuel H. Sheppard and Memorandum Regarding Admissibility of Character Evidence
of Samuel H. Sheppard was sent by ordinary United States Mail, postage prepaid, to Terry H. Gilbert,
1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, and also via facsimile transmission to Terry H. Gilbert
at (216) 621-0427, this

JI ~i!ay of February, 2000.

KATHLEEN A. MARTIN
Litigation Manager, Civil Division

-
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1996 WL 17314, State v. Croom, (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1996)

*17314
NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO
SUPREME
COURT
RULES
FOR
THE
REPORTING
OF
OPINIONS
IMPOSES
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.

ST ATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Bernard CROOM, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 67135.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga
County.
Jan. 18, 1996.
Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court, No.
CR-293443.
Stephanie
Tubbs
Jones,
Cuyahoga
County
Prosecutor, A. S. Dever, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney,
Louis
Brodnik,
Assistant
County
Prosecutor, Cleveland, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Thomas E. Shaughnessy, Cleveland, for DefendantAppellant.
Bernard Croom, Leavittsburg, prose.
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION
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4:10 a.m. He observed Michele Finklea's body lying
on the carpeted floor with her head propped against
the couch. On the carpet was a large amount of
blood, which had not dried and was mushy. He also
noticed the blood on Michele's body was also moist.
The blood was warm, and from his experience rigor
mortis had not occurred.
Lach recited his experience as a paramedic. He had
been a paramedic for six years. He had worked for
Cleveland for a year. Before that he had worked for
various other fire departmems. During his time as a
Cleveland paramedic, he had observed 15 to 20
fatalities a month. His education included both Tri-C
and on the job. Consequently, he offered his opinion
as to the time of the murder and opined that although
the stiffness existed in Michele's fingers, no stiffness
existed in her joints. Moreover, the stiffness in her
neck was from her head being propped against the
couch. From this along with the mushy, bloody
carpet and the lack of dry blood on the carpet and on
Michele's body, he concluded the time of the murder
was within a half hour to an hour before he arrived.
Lach also described Croom's behavior as unusual.
During his experience with 15 to 20 fatalities as a
Cleveland Paramedic, he had observed many family
members of fatality victims. These family members
would neither make eye contact nor stay in the room
with the victim. Lach said Croom did both.

PATRICIA AND BLACKNION, Judge:

-

**1
Defendant-appellant Bernard Croom appeals
his conviction for murder and assigns ten errors for
our review. (FNl) Having reviewed the record of the
proceedings and the legal arguments presented by the
parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The
apposite facts follow.

Lach said Croom was more interested in developing
his theory of the crime event rather than his mother.
Croom made sure that everyone in the room heard his
story, even making eye contact, Lach said. Lach,
furthermore, observed Croom's repetitive yelling
would end suddenly when he exited the room where
the body was located.

Michele Finklea was found murdered in her home
on the morning of January 10, 1993. Death was
caused by thrusts of a sharp instrument to Michele's
neck, a deep wound through her heart, and
perforations of the lung, liver, stomach, and back. In
total, she was stabbed 25 times.

Michele Finklea's brother, Alvin Croom, testified
his sister had been upset with the long hours her sons
were keeping. She had the only keys to the front
screen door and had told him she was planning to lock
them out in the future.
He said she was also
concerned about drugs in her house.

A jury convicted her son Bernard Croom of the
murder.
The state called several witnesses who
testified regarding her death, and their observation of
Croom on that morning.

Homicide Detective John Bornfield found no forced
entry to the house. The outside and back of the house
revealed no suspicious entry. On the couch near
Michele's body, he found a set of house keys. They
matched the front screened security door and the front
wooden door.
During the police questioning of
Croom, he said he entered the house with his keys.
Yet, after he was released from police custody, he

Cleveland Paramedic Wayne Lach concluded
Michele Finklea was murdered as recently as thirty
minutes before he arrived on the scene. He arrived at

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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-

called the police to get his mother's keys to lock the
front door of the house.
**2 Detective Bornfield also found a knife handle
near Michele Finklea's body. The blade was located
in the dining room. Michele's blood was on the
broken knife, which was believed to be the murder
weapon.

returned, lifted his mother's head, and knew she was
dead. He said Oliver was in his mother's room
asleep. Barnfield noticed Croom's jeans were torn on
the right knee, and he had blood on his thigh.
Barnfield asked him if he touched anything.
He
adamantly said "No." Croom told Bornfield the killer
knew his mother because she would not allow a
stranger to enter her home.

Detective Bornfield observed Michele Finklea's
body. Her shoulder, neck, and face were covered
with blood. Gashes were about her body specifically
the right side and back of her neck. The cuts on her
arms indicated she either struggled or attempted to
block the attack.

Barnfield arrested Croom because of the
inconsistency in his statement. He removed his pants
and jacket. The jacket had blood on the left shoulder,
but not the sleeves where Croom had said he cradled
his mother. Barnfield also noticed a fresh, untom
scratch mark on Croom's neck.

Near her body on the couch was a bloody, broken
crock."Pot. There was a thumb print on the inside of
the broken piece, which matched Croom's thumb.
Detective Prinz stated it was in a position consistent
with having been placed there either before
construction or after it was broken.

Croom called the coroner to learn, if any, skin
evidence was found under his mother's fingernails.

Blood was on the walls in the living room, dining
room, and kitchen. It was on the banister going into
the upstairs. No blood was found in the victim's
room.
Her room was reasonably undisturbed.
Money was on the dresser.
Croom's room was ransacked, and he claimed
money had been taken. A blanket with a drop of
blood on it was found in one of the opened dresser
drawers.
Later Croom's hands were examined for blood.
Blood was found in his fingernails and cuticles. The
blood analysis from the crime scene and Croom
revealed Michele's blood on the crockpot, on
Croom's jeans, on the broken knife, and on the
blanket in Croom's room. Blood was also on the
pillowcase near Michele's purse, which was Croom's
blood.
In the last bedroom, three year old Oliver Finklea,

Jr. was located. He had been asleep. He shared this
room with his other brother who was in the hospital
suffering from a gunshot wound.

-

Page 2

In a statement to the police, Croom said he left
home at midnight and returned at 4:00 a.m. He
entered the house with his key and found his mother's
purse open on the dining room table. In the living
room, he found his mother. He immediately exited
the house to seek help from the neighbors.
He

Croom spoke with Detective Kovacic on the day he
went to the station to obtain his mother's keys. While
there he offered to Kovacic his belief as to how his
mother was murdered. He said his mother would not
allow a stranger in her house, and the killer used
short, rapid thrusts with a knife to inflict the wounds.
He explained he was not afraid to stay in the house
because the killer was someone his mother knew.
The officer was impressed that Croom so accurately
portrayed how Michele was murdered.
**3 Three year old Oliver Finklea, Jr. had told his
father Oliver Finklea, Sr. that Bernard had killed his
mother. However, Croom had told Oliver, Sr. that
his brother did not see anything.
At trial, during questioning by the prosecution,
Oliver, Sr. testified his son had identified the
murderer. On cross-examination the defense asked
about William Blunt, and whether he knew that Blunt
was a suspect.
Oliver, Sr. replied "yes."
On
redirect, the prosecution asked if Blunt was the person
his son identified, and Oliver, Sr. said "No." On recross, the defense asked if Oliver, Jr. had been
inconsistent in his identification of the murder.
Oliver, Sr. said "No." Thereafter, the court allowed
the prosecution to ask who Oliver, Jr. consistently
identified, and Oliver, Sr. said "he first said it was a
black man and then he said it was 'Ber."' Oliver, Sr.
said he identified Bernard Croom as the killer.
Croom, during questioning by the police, was asked
if he killed his mother. He never denied it, he simply
asked to take a lie detector test. During the interview
the police described Croom as emotionless, cool, and
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